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The key finding of this examination is that some aspects of complexity theory,
relying on institutional and Austrian approaches, actually come full circle to a
neoclassical prescription of laissez-faire in regard to institution-building. Given the
complexity of both institutions and institutional systems, it is may be more
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development. This too, unfortunately, faces challenges as a result of complexity.
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1 Introduction
Critiques of neoclassical economics have increased in frequency and vehemence over
the past decade, spurred on by the global financial crisis, manifesting themselves in
one of two variants. The first category has been termed by Arnsperger and Varoufakis
(2006) as ‘‘unsophisticated:’’ criticisms that focus mostly on orthodox conceptions of
economic behavior and the market, railing against assumptions of rationality or
individualistic ‘‘instrumentalism’’ and debating neoclassical assumptions at their
margins. These criticisms tend to call for more of the same as an antidote for
perceived failings, such as increased regulation (Crotty 2009), better monetary policy
oversight (Allen and Snyder 2009), or massive increases in government spending
through monetary manipulation (Wray 2011).
However, a more sophisticated challenge to the ruling orthodoxy, arising from
across the heterodox spectrum (O’Hara 2007 notes it may be the only thing uniting
heterodox approaches), has instead confronted the entire foundation of neoclassical
reasoning. This further critique has focused on Walrasian assumptions of
equilibrium, taking up the original work of Scarf (1960) and Sonnenschein
(1972) to call for a ‘‘post-Walrasian economics’’ (Colander Shelley 1998). Based in
part upon real world experience (not least in the failures of development economics
to bring much of the world out of poverty), the anti-equilibrium critique conjectured
that reality contained multiple equilibria, and none of them was necessarily
‘‘natural’’. Thus, the movement of an economy in the aggregate was highly path-
dependent, a concept that was a direct repudiation of equilibrating tendencies
supposedly nested within an economy (Davis 2006).
But if equilibrium theory is ‘‘still dead after all these years’’ (Ackerman 2002),
what has taken its place? Early work dared not contemplate the full consequences of
what a violation of the assumption of equilibrium would mean; as Colander
(2003:19) noted, the question of a post-Walrasian world wouldn’t be ‘‘Why does the
economy exhibit instability and fluctuations?’’ but rather ‘‘Why does it exhibit as
little instability as it does?’’ It is only in recent years that complexity theory, with
some (but not all) aspects borrowed from the natural sciences, appears to have
stepped into explain what exists in this ‘‘unbridgeable gap between market behavior
and equilibrium theory’’ (Matutinovic 2010:32). Focusing on an evolutionary
approach to economics, and understanding that economic relations are enmeshed in
a series of small and large complex adaptive systems (CAS), certain aspects of
complexity theory embraces the idea that such systems may not tend to equilibrium.
In fact, taken as a whole, complexity theories understand that ‘‘out of equilibrium’’
may be the most often observed state of an economy, pervasive in such areas as
foreign exchange markets and the savings and investment nexus (Rosser 1999).
The increasing application of complexity theory to economic issues, and its
provision of a valid alternative to neoclassical equilibrium-based foundations,1 has
occurred at the same time as another breakthrough in mainstream economic
thinking: the acknowledgement of the importance of institutions in economic
1 Indeed, its popularity in policy, political science, and public administration journals have made
complexity theory, in the words of Koppl (2006), ‘‘heterodox mainstream’’.
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development. While Douglass North (1990) is credited with resurrecting institu-
tional analysis in the guise of the ‘‘new institutional economics’’ (NIE), empirical
research from Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2005), Rodrik et al. (2004), Glaeser et al.
(2004), and more recently Fatás and Mihov (2013) and Flachaire et al. (2014) has
confirmed the role that institutions play in determining the wealth or poverty of
nations. These approaches have incorporated many of the tenets of new institutional
economics, recognizing that economic outcomes are mediated and influenced by
institutional make-up and the broader cultural currents in a given society.
While there has been a welcome permeation of NIE tenets into empirical growth
work, the emphasis on institutions has still been somewhat limited: as Williamson
(2000:595) famously remarked, ‘‘the confession is that we are still very ignorant
about institutions’’. Indeed, much of the development literature has only considered
broader institutional changes or aggregated categories of institutions (such as
‘‘market-sustaining’’, to use Rodrik et al.’s (2004) terminology), with a scarce few in-
depth case studies examining the richness of institutional complexity and diversity
(the entire body of Elinor Ostrom’s work, typified in Ostrom (2005), being the major
exception to the neglect of institutions). To again quote Williamson (2000:595), the
chief reason for this ‘‘ignorance is that institutions are very complex’’, a reality that
makes them difficult to tackle in an equilibrium framework, given that they have
nonlinearities, exhibit threshold effects, and often lack definitive boundaries. In other
words, institutions themselves are complex adaptive systems, more suited to a
theoretical framework that recognizes this reality than standard neoclassical analysis.
This presents the development economist with a most terrible quandary: if
institutions are crucial for development of an economy (which is a complex system)
but institutions themselves are also complex adaptive systems, how can one possibly
hope to achieve a state of higher development? The purpose of this paper is to
further our knowledge of institutions in the pursuit of development by examining
institutions explicitly from the standpoint of certain aspects of complexity theory. It
is my contention that complexity theory has much to recommend it in terms of
understanding institutional composition, which then in turn has a direct impact upon
the development of a country’s (region’s/individual’s) economic outcomes. In
particular, complexity theory may help economists to understand what a ‘‘good’’
institution is and how it can function in a sea of institutions, as well as shedding
light on how such ‘‘good’’ institutions come to be.
Unfortunately, as this paper will show, the knowledge of the complexity of
institutions also presents a difficulty in attempting to influence their development
from either a centralized, planning sense or from an external (donor) agent. The key
finding of this examination is that understanding economic complexities, relying on
institutional and Austrian approaches, may actually come full circle to a
neoclassical prescription of laissez-faire, even while eschewing the idea of
equilibrium. In other words, equilibrium may exist, but the complex nature of
institutions and their operations make it incredibly difficult for a policymaker to
‘‘create’’ (or even understand) this equilibrium. It is may thus be more important to
remove barriers from the path to this better state than to actively engage in
institution-building. While this faces its own challenges from the point of view of a
complex system, it may be a reasonable solution for policymakers.
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2 Institutions and Complexity Theory
Institutions have been integral to the development of heterodox alternatives to
neoclassical and Walrasian approaches to economics, from the earlier work of the
‘‘old institutional economists’’ such as Veblen and Commons through to North,
Coase, Williamson, and Ostrom and new institutional economics. While the old
institutional approach was highly diverse and appeared to ‘‘differ greatly in terms of
fundamental philosophical and psychological propositions’’ (Hodgson 2006:218),
the NIE approach to economic analysis has been more unified in its underlying
fundamentals. Starting from a basis of methodological individualism, deriving
analysis from the actions of individuals (Klein 1999), the NIE distinguished itself
from old institutionalism, which had a heavy reliance on collection action. Perhaps
more importantly, as noted by Joskow (2008), the NIE approach attempted to
encompass longer term dynamic considerations associated with technological
change, the diffusion of innovations, and the impacts of institutions on the two as a
central part of its analysis.
Despite attempting to distinguish itself from the neoclassical paradigm (and of
course commonly classified as ‘‘heterodox’’), new institutional economics also
seemed to be content during the 1990s to focus on the ‘‘unsophisticated’’ critique of
neoclassical economics; this can be seen in some early writings of North, which
called for economists to ‘‘abandon… instrumental rationality—the assumption of
neoclassical economics that has made it an institution-free theory’’ (North 1992:3).
Similarly, as Joskow (2008:5) put it in a summary of the early NIE research,
‘‘institutions may be analyzed using the same types of rigorous theoretical and
empirical methods which have been developed in the neoclassical tradition whilst
recognizing that additional tools may be useful to better understand the development
and role of institutions in affecting economic performance’’. However, over the past
decade, much of the NIE school has moved away from equilibrium thinking, taking
up the mantle of Coase, who famously noted that equilibrist thinking ‘‘has directed
economists’ attention away from the main question, which is how alternative
arrangements will actually work in practice…. until we realize that we are choosing
between social arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to
make much headway’’ (Coase 1964:195). In short, new institutional economics
started to inch closer to the tenets of complexity theory as its defining structure.
Colander (1996) was one of the first to bring into play the ‘‘additional tools’’ that
Joskow (2008) spoke of, pointing to the synergies between complexity theory and
the approaches of new institutional economics. Meshing the idea of an economy
with multiple equilibria, comprised of individuals acting on the basis of local,
bounded rationality, Colander (1996) explicitly noted that institutions that underpin
systemic stability were a crucial component of complex systems. That is, economic
relationships amongst individuals were mediated and facilitated by institutions, but
also institutions placed a limit on (presumably harmful) human actions (Foster
2000), engendering stability of the complex system of the economy. Institutions
themselves were the product of complex forces at play in the broader economy, an
emphasis on context that converged with Hodgson’s (1998:168) note that
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‘‘institutionalists do not attempt to build a single, general model on the basis of
(rules, habits, and institutions). Instead, these ideas facilitate a strong impetus
toward specific and historically located approaches to analysis’’. From a complexity
standpoint, institutions were thus part of the web of interacting agents within an
economy, tailored to and arising from their particular circumstances but playing a
key role in influencing the path of an economic system.
2.1 Institutions as Complex Systems
This complexity approach to institutions placed institutions front and center as part
of complex adaptive systems, mediating economic outcomes, determining paths of
growth or stagnation, and shaping economic behavior. However, more importantly
from a development standpoint, institutions themselves appear to exhibit complex
adaptive traits, independent of their involvement in larger economic systems. As
Duit and Galaz (2008) note, complex adaptive systems are comprised of agents
acting on the basis of locally (not globally) available information, self-organizing
and evolving in a manner that creates multiple (and temporary) equilibria and
limited systemic predictability (Anderson 1999).
Taken against these benchmarks, institutions such as democracy or property
rights fit these characteristics and effects perfectly. In the first instance, institutions
are by their nature out-of-equilibria, in that they exist to shape and facilitate
transactions but are enmeshed in a world that is always changing. We will explore
these interactions more below, but suffice it to say at the moment that institutions
are, as Coase said, all in some way failures: for example, no political institution can
successfully rein in human nature in every situation, thus necessitating more and
more elaborate ways to create checks and balances. Or, to take another more
dramatic case, even the ‘‘stability’’ engendered by an autocracy can suddenly and
irrevocably shift in a ‘‘surprise’’ in response to an act such as special police shooting
protestors, turning a specific act of ‘‘law and order’’ into a major institutional shift.
When such a thing happens, as in Ukraine’s Maidan in 2014, one can only ask, was
the old order actually stable? Or was the political institution of the presidency in a
temporary equilibrium that shifted quickly because of new information and
behavioral shifts in outside agents?
The reality of institutions being in unstable equilibria or even continuously out of
equilibrium also implicitly informs the way the economics profession examines
institutions, in that we can rarely observe institutions in equilibrium… or sometimes
at all. An inexact parallel can be drawn from the natural sciences, as it appears that
institutions often seem to behave in ways analogous to Heisenberǵs Uncertainty
Principle, a result derived from quantum theory. Heisenberg postulated that we can
measure either the position or the momentum of a particle, but it would be
impossible to simultaneously measure both. In many ways, a similar type of
uncertainty is precisely the issue with institutions, in that we only see institutions by
how they are designed and how what they’re supposed to do (position) or how they
are changing (momentum), but never both at the same time.
I note this is an inexact parallel because, of course, institutions do not adhere to
rigid physical laws as do particles, weather, or other natural phenomena; this is a
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recurring issue in the application of complexity as observed in nature to an area such
as human action, which is unbound by such rigidities (Blaseio 1986). But the idea of
uncertainty does indeed apply to the manner in which we study economic systems
and, by extension, institutions, as observation of institutions embodies a host of
uncertainty regarding an institution’s movement and position within the system.
Such uncertainty is even more difficult to grapple with than in the natural sciences,
where aforementioned physical laws constrain the space of possibilities available to
any event (e.g. weather). No such constraint exists for institutions mainly due to
human action (an issue we will return to later).
This uncertainty, an outgrowth of the complexity of institutions, makes it
incredibly hard to prescribe an accurate path for an institution if we cannot
understand where it is at any given moment. To further extend the Heisenberg
metaphor, let us examine perhaps the most important institution for a functioning
market economy, property rights (Hartwell 2013). Observing the position of
property rights is often impossible, given that it requires such precise timing that we
cannot begin to aggregate all of the transactions that show that property rights are
working (and observing one business being opened does not suffice as proof of
property rights). In this situation, we have to tease out property rights levels by
looking at the inputs of the institution, gauging a country’s property rights
protection by (usually, but not always) the legislative framework surrounding
contract enforcement. In quantitative institutional economics, this is often done by
using subjective indicators such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
measures for investor protection or another index such as the Heritage Foundation’s
Index of Property Rights. Of course, this also runs into the issue that the legislation
that may provide guidance for an institution is itself part of a complex system and
derived from that system (Ruhl 1996), but for the purposes of observations, we treat
the priors to the legislation as exogenous.
But, if instead of observing the level (position) of property rights, we wish to
instead observe its trend (an institutional analogue to the natural science idea of
momentum), we are often forced to observe property rights in the breach rather than
their observance. That is, knowing what the position of property rights is in a
legislative framework is of no use in determining how they are implemented in
practice, and we often only see the results of property rights when the institution is
not functioning (but again, in the aggregate, as seeing one business closed does not
prove the absence of property rights). In practical terms in economics, this means a
reliance on objective indicators (see Voigt 2013 for a good overview of the
subjective versus objective debate) to capture this idea of ‘‘momentum;’’ in the case
of property rights, an often-used objective metric is ‘‘contract-intensive money’’,
which captures the amount of money inside the formal banking sector as a
percentage of all money (Clague et al. 1996). Contract intensive money captures
how people perceive their property rights after the fact, and thus captures the trend
of these rights in one direction, but as it is an expression of a complex system,
looking at the constituent pieces of this number on any 1 day tells us little about
property rights overall.
As noted, in addition to the difficulties in observing institutions across their
multiple equilibria, institutions also retain a key attribute of complex systems in that
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they display, as noted, little in the way of defined boundaries.2 As Cilliers
(2001:138–139) notes, ‘‘In order to be recognizable as such, a system must be
bounded in some way… [b]ut complex systems are open systems where the
relationships amongst the components of the system are usually more important
than the components themselves. Since there are also relationships with the
environment, specifying clearly where a boundary could be, is not obvious’’. To
return to our example of property rights, all theories of property rights formation
(see Demsetz 1967 or Mijiyawa 2013) recognize that these rights are shaped by
cultural, political, and other economic institutions, but part of the difficulty in
recognizing property rights is that we are quite unsure where they end or begin. Is it
limited solely to the legislative framework governing sale and transfer of land, does
it encompass business legislation, or does it extend to an independent judiciary and
ease of land titling? To be sure, we have knowledge of a core of property rights as
serving ‘‘a dual purpose of using (although not necessarily needing) the state for
enforcement while also guarding against the state’s own encroachment on the
individual’s property’’ (Hartwell 2016a:173). However, the instruments surrounding
this institution are in many ways difficult to define, and can be diversified across
cultures, national boundaries, and societies.
A further contribution to arguing for institutions as complex systems is their
evolutionary nature, typified in their persistence or, to use another term borrowed
from the regional economics debate (Simmie and Martin 2010), ‘‘resilience’’ over
time. In the words of Potts (2007:342), institutions are ‘‘structures that coordinate a
system of agents, but also processes that exist in historical time subject to evolution
and entropy’’. This definition also highlights that the development of particular
institutions is also highly path-dependent, with many potential multiple paths and
equilibria depending upon the culture, society and, as we will see, other institutions.
A key point to note here, however, as Martin (2010) does, is that institutional
evolution and its path dependence also does not exist in an equilibrist paradigm, in
that institutions can choose many ‘‘wrong’’ paths but only one ‘‘right’’ one to bring
it to equilibrium; rather, the complex approach to institutional evolution would
emphasize change rather than steady state, recognizing that an institution’s function
may remain the same even as its instruments or organization may differ depending
upon the circumstances.
This complexity approach links well with the economic analysis of institutions,
which notes that one of the key defining features of an institution is its semi-
permanence (Hartwell 2013). In fact, what distinguishes an institution from a
‘‘policy’’ is how it continues to exist and adapt and mediate behavior while
particular policies come and go, thus truly making it part of a system. And nowhere
is this staying power of institutions more apparent in how institutional effects can
persist over time and space, even after the institution itself has vanished. An
exciting new area of scholarship has begun to look at the effects of long-ago
institutions in shaping today’s economic outcomes, with papers such as Becker et al.
2 Again, here is where there is some divergence from the natural world, as phenomena such as weather
are bounded by a finite set of possibilities, even when accounting for interaction effects. Institutions, by
contrast, exhibit no such space of all conceivable functional paths. Many thanks are due to Helmuth
Blaseio for suggesting this point.
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(2016) positing that Austro-Hungarian empire’s institutions continue to influence
attitudes towards trust and corruption even today. Similarly, Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya (2015) look at the partition of Poland amongst the three empires of
Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Prussia, and test if being under the sway of a
particular empire and its institutional system left an indelible mark on contemporary
Poland (they find, perhaps surprisingly, that the main effects were cultural,
including religiosity and attitudes towards democracy).
Of course, this work can possibly be capturing the broader cultural currents rather
than the reality of complexity: one can plausibly conjecture that the imposition of an
Austro-Hungarian administrative state in a cultural ethos that was already inured to
such organization does not tell us about the failures of Austro-Hungarian institutions
but about the informal cultural institutions already at work. But keeping a focus on
complexity, it would be folly to think that these same cultural institutions did not
also influence the growth or development of the Austro-Hungarian institutions as
well. This supports the argument that, while institutions themselves are complex
adaptive systems, they are further nested in an economy within a complex
institutional structure which, taken in its totality, influences the economic system.
2.2 Institutional Systems as Aggregations of Complex Adaptive Systems
Indeed, when observing a broader institutional system or its overarching governance
structure (Williamson 1979), the applicability of complexity theory becomes even
more apparent. Not only do discrete institutions such as property rights rely on
broader cultural or legal developments, they are dependent upon other institutional
developments as well (and in turn help to shape these other institutions). This reality
too fits in with the ideas of complexity theory, which posit that complex systems
generate their own ‘‘system effects’’ that typically fall into one of three categories
(Duit and Galaz 2008):
• Threshold Effects Change often comes in a disjointed manner and is rarely
smooth, either characterized by abrupt shifts or slow transitions that result in an
entirely different internal organization (Gunderson and Holling 2002). In
particular, small changes that might not appear consequential can, in the right
atmosphere and at the right time, cause monumental shifts (e.g. as in the self-
organized criticality of the last grain of sand that causes the pile to collapse, Bak
et al. (1987)). This effect can be observed within a particular institution, but also
is a characteristic of institutional systems—the grain of sand is insular until it
interacts with other grains to become a sand pile.
• Surprises As interaction mechanisms are poorly understood, the system may
generate surprise outcomes, i.e. outcomes not even expected by those intimately
acquainted with the system and its rules or past behavior. Given the
unpredictability of systemic evolution, surprises are inevitable (Ruhl 1996),
and can cause (or be caused by) discrete institutional changes.
• Cascading Effects Finally, interconnected complex systems have intense
feedback and pass-through effects that can amplify an original event; Duit
and Galaz (2008) use the example of droughts in India, which caused poverty for
172 Homo Oecon (2017) 34:165–190
123
families that were previously more secure, which in turn led to health-related
problems in vulnerable populations. In an economic system, such feedback can
be easily seen through monetary policy stimulus, which can influence financial
markets, investment decisions of firms, individual decisions to make large
purchases, and, when the stimulus is withdrawn, a cascade of business failures,
bankruptcies, and clamor for more monetary stimulus.
In addition to these effects, an additional aspect of the complexity of institutional
systems is the diverse nature of institutions that make up such a system (a concept
championed by Ostrom (2005)). In any given economic system, there may be
institutions that depend upon others (i.e. a central bank is dependent upon a
government for its existence), institutions that fill holes created by others (various
financial institutions that cater to clientele underserved due to legislation or political
maneuvering), and even institutions that work directly counter to other ones in the
system (police versus organized crime, or informal markets against communist
planning organs). Indeed, the presence of duplicative and contradictory institutions
may unnecessarily increase the complexity of a system while still keeping an overall
balance to the system itself.
In this sense, and contra to Colander (1996), while single institutions may help to
guarantee systemic stability, the complexity of an institutional system may create
permanent instability, guaranteeing change rather than continuity. Or, as Bak et al.
(1988) noted in their study of self-organized criticality, the system may settle into the
most-unstable stability, a state where actions introduced from outside the system might
cause systemic collapse but, in the absence of such exogenous pressure, the system
remains intact (like the proverbial sand pile). However, Strambach (2010) also notes
that institutional systems also tend to be characterized by varying levels of influence of
constituent institutions (i.e. not every institution has equal weight), and thus a
‘‘dominant’’ institutional system may provide bounds for systemic instability via
institutions that are more powerful than others. This issue, of a differing distribution of
weights of institutions within a system, is something we will return to later.
Finally, building on this idea of ‘‘dominant’’ institutional systems in institutional
complexity is the familiar Schumpeterian process of ‘‘creative destruction’’
(Schumpeter 1942). While institutions are characterized by their resilience, this does
not mean that they exist forever (especially in the political sphere): like individuals,
institutions age, transform, and if no longer needed, die within a broader institutional
system. The system is therefore also undergoing an evolutionary process, one by
which inefficient institutions die out and are overrun by ‘‘fit’’ ones (Bisignano (1998)
shows this process for financial sector institutions). This process need not be
instantaneous, however, and many ‘‘inefficient’’ institutions may survive long past
their sell by date due to the reality of institutional inertia, vested interests keeping
institutions on life-support, or the sheer complexity of institutional interrelatedness
making the cost of changing one institution prohibitively high (Setterfield 1993).3
3 Acemoglu (2006) models how this might be so, although he does so utilizing a neoclassical assumption
of institutional system equilibrium.
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3 Complexity, Institutions, Development
If institutions are complex systems unto themselves, further nested in a complex
institutional system, it is easy to see that, as Potts (2007:341) correctly noted, that
‘‘as institutions evolve, so do economic systems’’. This evolution of institutions and
institutional systems is what brings us to the heart of the relationship between
complex institutions and economic development. Taking these relationships to the
next logical step, it is apparent to see as institutional change necessarily leads to
changes in the broader economic environment, these complex methods of
adaptation thus are economic development.4 As Barder (2012) noted, ‘‘Develop-
ment is not the sum of well-being of people in the economy and we cannot bring it
about simply by making enough people in the economy better off. Development is
instead a system-wide manifestation of the way that people, firms, technologies and
institutions interact with each other within the economic, social and political
system’’. Understood properly, this means that development, like the institutions
that make up the economic system, is path dependent, a form of economic evolution
that is shaped internally while external forces prod and shape various evolutionary
paths. It is also the point where strict parallels with natural phenomena starts to
break down, as natural systems are rigidly bound by physical laws, and there is way
to consider ‘‘improvement’’ in a system, as it implies a state beyond the existing
system (i.e. the creation of new, heretofore undiscovered and non-existent forms of
weather). But this still relates to many tenets of complexity theory for, as Holcombe
(2012) asserts, the idea of progress is explicitly a non-equilibrist position, as
economies in motion are not in equilibrium.
However, the concept of ‘‘economic development’’ itself, while not explicitly
equilibrist, does imply linearity, measured by increasing GDP per capita, more
happiness, or increases in other metrics that attempt to capture the sum of well-
being in the economy. In this sense, both the term and the concept ‘‘economic
development’’ exhibit not a positive description but instead a normative prescrip-
tion: if economic development can be properly thought of as a complex
evolutionary process, it does not need to be linear or historically determined. This
distinction if crucial for, when one speaks of ‘‘economic development’’ in
mainstream economics, they are not talking about development but about
improvement. An economic system can go in many directions, but it is implicit
that the ‘‘development’’ really goes in only one (see Fig. 1).
Taking all of these facts into account means that economic improvement
commonly referred to as development must be related directly to the improvement
of the institutions that make up the economic system. Policies may play a short-term
role in shaping expectations, but development is primarily related to the upgrading
of the economic interactions in a system and how they are facilitated. But in order to
improve economic interaction, we need to refer back to the level of the individual
institution within the larger economic system and how it interacts with the larger
4 This equating of institutional change to economic development is parallel to the view that (as noted
elsewhere, see Hartwell 2013) ‘‘transition’’ economics and the move from communism to capitalism was
at its heart about institutional reform, and not about delivering better GDP results. Improved economic
outcomes are a second-order effect of changed institutions.
174 Homo Oecon (2017) 34:165–190
123
institutional structure and broader economic system as a whole. A large school of
thought has grown up around ‘‘transaction cost economics’’ (Williamson 1979),
with researchers noting that the existence of institutions is related directly to their
ability to surmount informational asymmetries, reduce uncertainty, and establish
stability for interactions at the margins to occur (Meyer 2001). This is true to a
point, as many institutions do provide clear rules of the game and reduce
uncertainty, property rights paramount amongst them.
But these market-facilitating institutions (borrowing the nomenclature from
Hartwell 2013) are not the only ones that exist in a broader institutional system, as
noted above; political institutions, for example, that have an explicitly re-
distributive nature about them may only add to uncertainty and certainly do not
facilitate (at least formal) economic interactions. When thinking about develop-
ment, it is then perhaps important to recognize that some institutions are a priori
better than others, at least in fostering the conditions needed for an economic system
to improve. Institutions that facilitate market interactions and, most importantly,
lower the transaction costs of these interactions, appear to be paramount for
systemic improvement, as they would create the environment for an economic
system to develop. In a world of complexity, institutions that streamline costs,
facilitating information flows, and make interactions easier also make life simpler
for the individuals that comprise an economy. Complexity creates its own demand
for simplicity, even if the system itself remains unfathomably complex.
Narrowing down further to the types of institutions that could make the existing
complex facets of an economy simple, it is possible that they could be political in
nature, for example, those that codify property rights or enforce them, such as an
independent judiciary. It is more likely, however, that they would be primarily
Fig. 1 Institutions, institutional systems, economic systems, and development
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economic institutions, as they are ‘‘concerned, as a matter of design, with
maximizing the utility of principals in the economic sphere; that is, in solely
influencing and mediating economic outcomes’’ (Hartwell 2013:32). Given that
market interactions are entirely economic, it logically follows that institutions
concerned with this sphere would be more essential than, say, democratic
accountability. Moreover, the crucial institutions for economic improvement need
not only be formal institutions, such as government-created courts, but more likely
will also encompass informal and social institutions such as churches, civil society,
and other informal mechanisms arising organically from a society. And finally,
these institutions need not be complicated; as many authors have noted, complex
doesn’t mean complicated (Waldrop 1992), and many of the most resilient
institutions (as with biological organisms) are often the simplest.
With a concentration on lowered transaction costs, development in the ‘‘correct’’
direction could occur more easily. However, a focus on the lowering of transaction
costs may also paradoxically increase complexity within a system, by facilitating
entry into the system and requiring new institutions to deal with new entrants
(Kauffman 1993). For example, removing political institutions to increase economic
interaction, the end result is that more agents will become involved in economic
relationships.5 An example of this would be removal of a government’s oversight
role in occupational safety; such a diminution of these costs would likely increase
entrepreneurial entry into the economic system, thus entailing additional institu-
tional mechanisms to ensure safety is still achieved (consumer demand for safety
does not disappear simply because the institution charged with it disappears).
Similarly, decentralization of fiscal functions within a government may lead to
better outcomes based on subsidiarity and lowering of transaction costs, but the
fragmentation of institutional knowledge may increase the complexity across new
units in the system.
Thus, a key point in understanding ‘‘development’’ is that it requires institutional
improvement, especially for economic institutions which deal with transaction
costs, but such improvement does not necessarily make a complex system simpler in
its totality. That is, it is not a truism that better institutions ? less complex-
ity ? development as, if anything, more complex systems at the country level
exhibit more development. Manifestations of such an increase in complexity could
include technological innovation (Wolter and Veloso 2008), new firm creation
(Frenken and Boschma 2011), or the realization of entirely new sectors of the
economy (Saviotti and Pyka 2004), all of which make dealing in a country
institutional system more difficult in the short-run. Indeed, transaction costs may
even increase in the short-run as institutions within the system adjust to the new
higher levels of complexity and/or new ones arise to cope with the new complexity.
But these adjustments within the system necessarily create what we refer to as
‘‘development’’, as they foster the conditions for improved economic outcomes
without necessarily putting a normative constraint on what those outcomes should
be in equilibrium.
5 Many thanks are due an anonymous referee who pointed out this fact.
176 Homo Oecon (2017) 34:165–190
123
3.1 Building Institutions for Development?
If institutions that lower transaction costs matter for development, then how these
institutions come to be must then be the crucial question to attaining development. It
is here that the ideas of complexity take on a whole new meaning, for the question
of institutional development is reliant upon several intersecting complex adaptive
systems (as shown in Fig. 1), each with its own influence.
Indeed, there is a long and distinguished pedigree in both the political science
and economics (as well as sociological, anthropological, and other) literature on
how institutions develop and what matters most. Recent mainstream economics
research has coalesced around what has been termed the ‘‘legal origins theory’’
(Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)), where a key determinant of institutional path
development in (mostly) colonized nations was the type of legal system that was
imported. La Porta et al. (1999) show empirically the relationship between various
types of legal regimes and subsequent growth, finding that common law countries
have deeper financial markets and more advanced property rights than civil law
countries. Although their approach has been challenged on methodological grounds
(Spamann 2010), a more pertinent critique from the complexity approach concerns
the supposed exogeneity of legal systems (Armour et al. 2009). Legal systems do
not arise in a vacuum, a point acknowledged in a follow-up article by the original
authors (Shleifer et al. 2008) but one that they countered by widening the definition
of ‘‘legal regime’’ to encompass many other facets of the complex system of
institutions (Michaels 2009). Indeed, informal and formal legal institutions often
arise in tandem, one influencing the other, with informal rules become formal laws
and formal laws relegated to obscurity when informal norms change. In such a
complex environment, formal legal institutions are very difficult to disentangle from
their informal counterparts, and thus understanding which came first can be
problematic for institutional creation. As complexity theorists have asserted,
measurement of initial conditions is infinitely sensitive, as the ‘‘slightest discrep-
ancy in measurement could throw out the results by a vast amount’’ (Hartston 1997).
Taking up this challenge of institutional endogeneity in a similar but contrary
vein, a variety of theories on state formation have asserted that the legal framework
that gives rise to an institution only comes about from the institution of the
government, or, put another way, that political institutions determine economic
institutions. This view, voiced most prominently in Charron et al. (2012), claims
that the organs of government and how they develop (whether they are
‘‘patrimonial’’ or ‘‘bureaucratic’’) determines the legal structure and thus creates
economic institutions as well. Charron et al. (2012) distinguish themselves from the
La Porta et al. (1999) analysis by focusing exclusively on OECD countries, thus
taking a further step back; while La Porta et al. (1999) examine the colonized lands
and the legal system that was brought there, Charron et al. (2012) instead examine
the colonizers and how they created such a legal system in the first place.
Of course, the Charron et al. (2012) analysis suffers from its own empirical and
theoretical flaws. By focusing only on OECD countries, it ignores much more recent
examples of endogenous institutional development (to whit, the transition countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union) in favor of ‘‘safer’’
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territory. But their analysis also suffers from intense theoretical flaws as well,
focusing only on formal institutions (and explicitly on political institutions),
arbitrarily drawing the line on when a ‘‘state’’ is formed and when law arises.
Framing their entire argument on the tension between ‘‘society’s efficiency’’ and a
ruler’s propensity to grab and run, they neglect what other complexities contributed
to the ruling arrangements in the first place. Napoleon, one of their prime examples
of a ruler who chose a particular legal regime, was a product of a very specific time,
place, and cultural milieu, something that could explain the emergence of a
bureaucracy inimical to property rights.
As can be seen from these opposing viewpoints, the difficulty in determining
institutional genesis vanishes once a clear demarcating line pre-institution has been
set. If we set the beginning of the institution as when it achieves formality or is
protected in law (i.e. legal status), then we can argue that the legal system is the
reason that this particular institution came to be. Similarly, if we say that the legal
system needed to come from somewhere, and it was a particular government that
created the legal system, we can draw the line at the formation of the government
and proudly exclaim the need for a state to create institutions. However, of course,
neither of these approaches are accurate, as the legal system and the government
came from earlier origins rooted in culture, exogenous forces, and the intricacies of
the complex adaptive system in which they formed.
Perhaps a better explanator for institutional genesis would be Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), who isolated an exogenous (to the system) variable in exploring
the mortality rates of settlers as the determinant of institutional paths. This has the
benefit of a clear starting point (the moment that settlers arrived at a virgin land), a
clear path dependence (dead men create no institutions), and somewhat recognizes
that, by self-selecting out of one complex adaptive system (the home country),
settlers may be creating an entirely new one organically. The drawbacks of this
approach are, of course, that it applies only in specific historical circumstances;
moreover, and perhaps more importantly (as with the examples of Poland and
Austria-Hungary above), the effects of prior institutions in the home country may be
more powerful than is assumed by this approach. That is, even if the new world
appears to be tabula rasa, the individuals that settle it still bring their pre-formed
notions of the rules and norms governing interactions. It would not be a case so
much of creating a new complex system than of the original system undergoing
meiosis, creating a smaller version of itself that then combines with new stimuli to
create a new, fused system.
3.2 Importing Conditions, Importing Institutions
It is precisely this complexity of institutional genesis that makes assisting
institutional development a dangerous game for development, especially as it
relates to foreign aid or formal development assistance. While there has been a
greater recognition in the international donor community of the importance of
institutions over the past 25 years, the approach towards institutional change has
been ignorant of the complexity of institutional genesis. In many instances, donors
have attempted to create development in poorer countries by exporting institutions
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wholesale (Jayasuriya 2001; Sherieff 2014), a process that has assumed imposing a
foreign object into a country’s national institutional structure can somehow
dominate the structure and pull the entire system in the direction of development.
Ironically, this approach was harshly critiqued during the transition process in
Central/Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, albeit from a different angle.
During the 1990s, the argument was, for the most part, not that ‘‘institutions were
not being built’’ (although Kołodko 1999 differs), but that the wrong kind of
institutions were being built. A brilliant example of this thinking is Stiglitz (1999),
where he asserts that transition would be completed if tax administrations could just
be improved, a belief which is contra to all of transaction cost economics and, as it
turned out, history as well. Unfortunately, assertions such as this still assume
information about the system that is inherently unpredictable, and in most cases,
unknowable, so that talking of specific institutions to assist is surely a guessing
game with no provable counterfactual. Even surely novel recommendations, such as
Durlauf (1998), that policymakers should gather more evidence before implement-
ing a policy appears to be worthless in the face of complex adaptive systems.
Moreover, the vast bulk of development assistance has been on creating or
assisting formal, political institutions,6 which also presupposes that the political
structure in an economy can effect major institutional changes throughout the entire
institutional system. Of course, a major failing in thinking about ‘‘governments’’
and what they can do to further institutional development is that we often think of
government as its own monolithic creature, a fallacy that public choice literature has
highlighted again and again (Buchanan 1984). Governments are themselves political
institutions pursuing economic goals via a variety of means, influencing their
environment and in turn interacting with those outside of government, while being
shaped from within by political actors, differing institutions, and the polity at large.
Treating government as one indivisible institution capable of influencing other
institutions ignores the complexity within even a single government agency, not to
mention across a large and multi-faceted organism like a federal government; this
approach also often only deals with centralized governmental institutions, impacting
not only broader economic institutions within the system but even disrupting
information flows between central and local government institutions (Berkes 2002).
It also ignores the inherent non-linearity of government actions, which, due to
exigencies of a democratic system (to take one example) can suddenly reverse from
1 year to the next or be changed entirely due to election results (Richards and Doyle
2000). Even best practices which note the need for ‘‘political will’’ in building
institutions can flounder on the realities of complexity.
Despite the amounts of money and time invested, there has been little rigorous
research on the effects of top-down political institution building. As Bräutigam and
Knack (2004:260) note, ‘‘the way large amounts of aid are delivered can weaken
institutions rather than build them… through the high transaction costs that
accompany aid, the fragmentation that multiple donor projects and agendas
promote, problems of ‘poaching,’ obstruction of opportunities to learn, and the
6 Meyer’s (1992) premature worry that development assistance was shifting primarily to NGOs appears,
in light of the history, to have been unfounded.
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impact of aid on the budget process’’. There is some empirical basis for this
supposition, as Remmer (2004) has found that foreign assistance not only increases
the absolute size of government but degrades the government’s own ability to
generate revenue. Similarly, from the point of view of donors, an early survey by
Moore et al. (1995:60) for the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
concluded that (as complexity theory would predict),
…institution building projects tend to be less successful than [aid agencies’]
other projects. The most common explanation focuses on the nature of aid
agencies themselves: the fact that their relatively bureaucratic procedures and
‘‘alien’’ status in host countries make it difficult for them to meet the needs of
institution building projects: flexibility; sensitivity to local circumstances;
focus on process rather than on meeting targets, especially expenditure
targets; willingness to experiment and learn; and long-term commitments.
This reality appears to carry through to the present day, as Humphreys et al.
(2013) show that a project in Eastern Congo funded by the UK government had
virtually no impact on behavior in the region.
To some extent, there has been an acknowledgement of this reality in
development assistance: if the ‘‘exporting’’ approach to institutional development,
a simple solution to a complex issue, is ineffective, perhaps the next-best solution is
to import the legislation that can create the institution. An outgrowth of the ‘‘law
and development’’ tradition that took hold in the 1960s (Trubek 2006), international
donor agencies have been instrumental in bringing ‘‘best practice’’ law to
developing countries, adapting developed country legislation in order to create
the conditions for institutional genesis. As a theoretical basis, this approach
comports with legal origins theory, in that the legal regime, if taken from the correct
tradition, could help to push institutional change.
However, the importation of foreign legislation also has had little success in the
aggregate, as the entire process of importing a legal regime runs into a large
problem of reverse causality. In particular, it is highly plausible that countries that
see success in adopting a foreign legal regime would have approximated that regime
anyway, due to other traits of the economic system and culture. To return to our
application of Heisenberg to institutional development, one may observe the success
of a particular piece of legislation, but that observation does not mean we have the
knowledge of what created that position (what momentum went into creating such
legislation). Similarly, while an argument can be made that development assistance
helped to speed up the process, this also doesn’t consider the costs of such an
implementation against the benefit of immediate legal change. Moreover, consider
the myriad of instances where importing legislation did not work (Davis and
Trebilcock 2008); the approach of Charron et al. (2012) can provide an insight on
the failures of legal grafting in these cases, as laws without either an appropriate
bureaucratic base to implement them (see the issue of corruption in Ukraine in
Shelley 1998) or broad acceptance in society can be subverted. The legislative
school also, as with importing institutions, has a heavy reliance on centralized
governmental procedures, once again focusing on one set of institutions to the
exclusion of others.
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In sum, it appears that donors trying to send their own institutions elsewhere
without recognition of the complex adaptation process that create market-
facilitating institutions are wasting economic resources from their own economic
systems. But still we wish to see development progress, to return better economic
outcomes and improve the lives of humanity. How then can this be done?
3.3 Is Development the Removal of Barriers?
While the difficulty of importing institutions creates a conundrum for policymakers
who may want to do something (anything!), it provides a rich new area of analysis
for economists: despite the statistical unlikelihood of anything ever happening
anywhere in the universe, things still do happen and countries do develop. Given
that this is the case, it is perhaps more important for policymakers to focus their
energies elsewhere in pursuit of development. Perhaps the case may be that
‘‘efficient’’ institutions will emerge if they are not impeded by other institutions
within the system. That is, if positive action cannot be implemented to ensure
institutional development for the better, then perhaps removal of barriers that
prevent the emergence of market-facilitating institutions could be paramount to
creating development.
Put another way, it may not be possible to import directly institutions for
development, or even to copy the legal regimes that give rise to ‘‘good’’ institutions,
but the barriers to institutional development within a complex system can be
identified and removed. A brief digression is needed here; by ‘‘barriers’’, I mean
either natural or humanly-devised constraints that prevent the emergence of key
institutions. In some areas, barriers are readily identifiable: geographic idiosyn-
crasies that prevent trade institutions from flourishing are one such example, as are
political requirements that equipment must be licensed and approved before use.
Barriers such as these have varying levels of difficulty in overcoming, but each one,
if removed, could help to facilitate the growth of market-enabling institutions.
This approach is not an equilibrist position, as all economies are transitioning and
all institutions are in the state of flux, but is rather a way of letting the forces that
already are part of a nation’s economic system developing along their own logic to
improve economic outcomes. This approach would be the polar opposite of Arthur’s
(1999) ‘‘gentle nudge’’ of government, taking an explicitly negative approach
towards a system rather than a positive prescription for institution-building. Indeed,
framing development as removal of barriers along a particular systemic path, rather
than thinking of it as building something anew, may help to influence our
understanding of institutional change in a complex adaptive system.
Removal of barriers would, as a practical matter and as noted above, be based on
the metric of reduction of transaction costs within the institutional system. Such a
metric would necessarily favor the preservation of formal and informal economic
institutions, which should play a vital role in mitigating complexity for the
individual, if not within the entire system. Thus, for a policymaker to remove
barriers to institutional development, formal political institutions would likely be
the first to be targeted for removal, given their ability to create complexity in an
economic system (see for example Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) on political
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losers) and dampen rather than facilitate markets.7 This approach turns the state
formation theories of Charron et al. (2012) on their head in one particular respect:
yes, government may be responsible for the current state of economic institutions,
and isn’t that a pity. Moreover, political institutions are some of institutions that are
the ‘‘easiest’’ to dismantle (at least relative to informal economic dealings or even
formal property rights), and thus the balance in an economic system would be
shifted away from political and toward economic institutions to achieve
development.
That is not to say that this approach is itself not problematic from a complexity
standpoint. In the first instance, any deliberate institutional changes will be subject
to the same forces of complexity and unintended consequences that led to the
creation of an institution in the first instance. Countries are always-evolving
institutional systems, and the removal of institutional barriers may well create
temporary instability within the system, at the very least increasing transaction costs
in the short-run and perhaps also increasing uncertainty. But such instability will be
very distinct (and likely much milder) than the issue noted above, that of importing
an institution into an already-existing institutional system. The removal of an
institution from an existing system will cause dislocation as institutions seek to fill
the gap, but the institutions that exist already have knowledge of the complexities
and intricacies of a country institutional system, as Hayek (1945) noted; foreign
institutions grafted on to an existing system do not have this same knowledge, and
thus can cause much more disruption, duplication, and dislocation. It is the
difference between bringing a new couch blindly into a furnished apartment (with
all the difficulties inherent in getting it through the door and having it match the
current decor) versus rearranging the furniture when one piece breaks.
Other critiques of this approach are much more difficult to surmount. While
policymakers may be intent on improving flows of knowledge to lower transaction
costs, removing barriers as an action requires an incredibly deep understanding of
which barriers or which institutions are impeding ‘‘development’’. In a complex
system of institutions, it may be nearly impossible to understand where transaction
costs are derived from, as certain institutions may be masking where costs or
frictions are generated. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2010:146) note, ‘‘many
dysfunctional economic institutions are supported by a system of specific laws and
regulations that relate to these institutions’’. Does one begin by removing the tax
man, the tax administration, the office of the Prime Minister who sets policy, or the
entire government? Different theories of economic development would have
different prescriptions, leaving us no wiser as to where the problem issues from.
A way around this issue may be for policymakers to focus on the more influential
barriers in a society. As noted above, not all institutions within a system carry equal
weight, and thus a rule of thumb for policymakers may be to focus on the more
dominant institutions (in practice usually formal political institutions). The benefit
of this approach is precisely that many other institutions depend upon this one
institution, and thus removal can create a domino effect. But this approach may also
be difficult in a polarized or fragmented society, as political institutions that have an
7 See the example of occupational health and safety agencies in the previous section.
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explicit market-dampening effect may also create fierce political resistance if
removed; one need only look at Malaysia’s complex web of racial policies to see
such a system with deep roots. Removing both the formal racial quotas and the
surrounding informal societal structures may lead to highly persistent systemic
instability of the type detrimental to development.
Another possible way to effectively remove institutional barriers may be to
reduce duplication. Also as noted above, institutional systems tend to be
characterized by institutions (whether formal or informal) which directly contradict
each other, thus increasing system complexity needlessly. Thus another informal
rule that may provide guidance is removing formal institutions that are misaligned
with informal institutions, such as monetary policies that are directly contradictory
to black market exchange rates. In this manner, the removal of competing
institutions can help to lessen institutional and institutional-system complexity
while not increasing the complexity of the country-system as a whole. Of course, the
difficulty that arises here is that it is sometimes the informal institution that
contributes to instability (racism being one example); while it is easy to say that the
institution that increases the complexity of the system by forming its opposite
should be removed, this is more difficult in the case of entrenched societal values.
A final issue regarding the removal of institutional barriers relates to the issue of
permanence. In a non-equilibrating system, institutions and institutional systems do
not remain static but continue to evolve and change; while institutions themselves
are characterized by semi-permanence, their environment is not. In such a fluid
environment, there is no guarantee that institutional changes imposed from above,
even if they may facilitate exchange and reduce transaction costs in the long run,
will not themselves be reversed. This problem, of ‘‘time inconsistency’’ in economic
parlance, has been treated better in the political science literature as an issue of
‘‘commitment’’ (see, for example, Bunce 1999 in the transition context). If one
institution can impose its will over other institutions in the system, there is no
guarantee that a decision will remain intact over time. This uncertainty over
permanence that accompanies such a shift in the institutional system may also lead
to increased transaction costs over time, negating the gains of the removal of the
institution in the first instance. This would then translate to slower development, as
resources are tied up in the waiting.
3.4 Institutional Adjustments for Development: An Example
This paper has thus far laid out a case for institutions and institutional systems as
complex and adaptive, advancing the idea that the removal of barriers (i.e.
transaction costs) within an economic system is the way for a system to achieve
development but without imposing an equilibrium ideal. This idea animates much of
‘‘transaction cost economics’’, as laid out by Williamson (1979), as well as the strain
of new institutional economics which Douglass North led (see especially North
1990). These researchers, joined by many others, have provided many historical
examples of how the emergence of institutions lessening transaction costs allowed
for country economic systems to develop. Most importantly, as North (1990)
pointed out, there has been a ‘‘diverse degree of success’’ amongst ‘‘developed’’
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countries, with different institutional make-ups and organization; thus, there may
not be one path to development, but the function (i.e. lessening of transaction costs)
needs to be the same.
Such cost-reducing institutions dot the landscape of history in successful
economies, with the example of Poland providing a good case study of such
development.8 Poland’s long March towards ‘‘development’’, going back to the
creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1386, has been a struggle
between transaction cost-lessening and transaction cost-increasing institutions. In
the early years of the Commonwealth, as elsewhere on the European continent, a
myriad of institutional arrangements competed with each other within the national
economy. While, as a Kingdom, Poland saw continuous efforts by the executive to
concentrate power in the monarchy, Poland began its journey of capitalist
development through a more decentralized institutional regime, predicated on the
growth of towns granted self-governance by the crown (Murphy 2012). These
smaller units created local-level enforcement mechanisms and implementing
institutions such as village courts, creating an effective means for alleviating
transaction costs and informational asymmetries (Guzowski 2014). In this sense, the
broader political institutions governing the country had created the conditions for
lowering transaction costs simply by decentralizing governance at the town level;
such a move enabled the creation of distinct yet tailored institutional mechanisms
which furthered commerce and created growth in the Polish countryside (Guzowski
2013).
Other institutions within the system were not so kind for transaction costs,
however, and the persistence of feudal relations and particularly serfdom continued
to constrain labor mobility and the ability of individuals to partake in independent
economic relations. Moreover, as noted above, the history of the Polish state in the
fifteenth through eighteenth centuries was of an executive continually trying to
transfer power from the szlachta (the landed nobility) to himself; the competition
that this created led to periodic rebellions and foreign adventurism, both of which
handicapped the development of economic institutions within the country (Hartwell
2016b). The total effect of the sclerosis induced by serfdom and the institutional rot
effected by continuous war was a collapse of the Polish state and partition, with
parts of Poland absorbed into its three neighboring empires (Russia, Prussia, and
Austria-Hungary).
Of course, as noted above, just because a country ceases to be does not mean that
its institutions also must cease, as informal institutions are just as important in
fashioning an economic system. In Poland, the process of institutional genesis and
evolution stratified along the lines of Partition, with institutions evolving depending
on which existing institutional regime they interacted with (Grosfeld and
Zhuravskaya 2015). Practically, this meant the creation of Polish-only institutions
such as cooperatives and even social groups, all of which attempted to lessen the
transaction costs acquired by foreign domination for Poles in the occupied
territories. In the Austro-Hungarian partition, these indigenous institutions were
enabled by a somewhat more liberal governing regime, but in the Prussian and
8 This section is based on material found in Hartwell (2016b).
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especially Russian partitions, Polish institutions were kept necessarily small-scale.
Under Partition, thus, institutions for Poles arose generally to deal with the
conditions of Partition, pushing development forward in spite of the institutional
order which was imposed from above.
Poland’s experience after regaining its independence after the First World War,
and throughout the interwar period, shows the difficulty of preserving such
facilitating institutions, especially when political institutions have been given
priority. The desire to foster a Polish nation and a Polish identity meant that the
successive Polish governments from 1919 to 1939 were concerned with funneling
development into a certain pre-determined path. This meant conscious erection of
some barriers (protectionism), unwitting imposition of barriers in other spheres
(profligate monetary policy resulting in hyperinflation), and a steady March towards
proto-fascism in both the political and economic spheres. It is hard to argue that the
policies undertaken by Poland’s interwar governments enabled ‘‘development’’, in
as much as they reinforced rigidity within the system, making it less able to adapt
and more susceptible to collapse when faced with an external threat.
It was not until the fall of communism in 1989 that where Poland’s new
generation of leaders set about radically removing barriers to institutional
development (for an in-depth examination of this process, see Hartwell 2016b).
Central to the process of transformation was the ‘‘Balcerowicz Plan’’, named after
the Deputy Prime Minister/Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, which outlined a
series of policies that Poland’s first post-communist government (elected in June
1989) were to follow in order to transition the economy to a market-based structure.
While there was much debate at the time on ‘‘sequencing’’ and the virtues of
‘‘macroeconomic stabilization’’ above all else, the Balcerowicz plan had a much
more ingenious approach to Poland’s development in that it acted precisely in the
manner described above, removing barriers to voluntary exchange and allowing for
institutional development to occur in a somewhat spontaneous fashion.
The heart of the Balcerowicz plan was its approach towards the relations between
economic actors and the state. Under communism, the state was a planning
apparatus, in charge of the means and distribution of production, effectively
increasing transaction costs for private exchange to infinity (especially if one
considers the pain of death in Stalin’s Soviet Union or in today’s North Korea for
indulging in private exchange). In order to transition from this economic system,
institutional change was required, but such a change needed to foster institutions
that would facilitate the market economy while supplanting, reforming, or
eliminating those that facilitated the planned economy. Given that nearly all formal
institutions under communism were tied directly (financially and politically) to the
state, the Plan’s point to ‘‘reject state intervention in the activities of competitive
enterprises’’ meant a shift in the incentives of every enterprise in the country. In one
fell swoop, it eliminated most artificial transaction costs to commerce, allowing for
the evolution and embrace of market-facilitating institutions while causing
‘‘inefficient’’ communist-era institutions to wither on the vine.
The Polish experiment has not been an unequivocal success in driving
development. In fact, there also was an equilibrium of sorts that subsequent Polish
governments attempted to reach in the institutional make-up of the country, and that
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was the goal of EU accession. Indeed, after 1992, when EU accession seemed a
possibility, and Brussels instituted a road-map for Poland and other CEE countries
to follow, the institutional path was set. But in the heady, early days of transition,
there was no such road-map to follow, and it was more important to remove barriers
than (as the interwar government had done) set a path on which the country must
proceed. And, as complexity theory would predict, the interaction of institutions
within the new economic system created by post-communist Poland has seen some
reversals and re-institution of barriers to development. More than anything, the
example of Poland teaches that lessening transaction costs in a complex
environment is not a one-time activity, and institutions must continuously adapt.
But it also teaches that development occurs in the aftermath of such adaptation, in
the spaces where transaction costs are actually diminished.
4 Conclusion
This paper has applied tenets of complexity theory to the study of institutions and
institutional systems, showing the difficulty in achieving an inorganic path to
development. The reality of institutional complexity and the difficulty of influencing
institutional development from the outside appears to vindicate Austrian approaches
to coordination (Hayek 1964) and ‘‘spontaneous order’’ (which Kilpatrick 2001 has
argued is another variant of complexity theory). Institutions, even though they may
serve similar functions, are different in different societies, and even knowing what
outcome is desired from an institution is of little help in achieving that outcome in
such a complex system as a national economy. Of course, just as there is very little
movement towards a prescriptive institutional economics in the literature, there are
also few normative prescriptions that can be found in an application of these aspects
of complexity theory to institutional, and thus economic, development. If, as noted
above, it is difficult to even observe institutions, it surely must be difficult to create
them. And thus, it is especially difficult to improve institutions to foster
development. In many cases, the only apparent prescription for policymakers boils
down to the Hippocratic Oath’s injunction of first, do no harm.
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